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AbstrAct
The Brazilian Amazon supplies the world with several forests ecosystem services, many of which are essential to 
sustain human life on earth. Nevertheless, the Amazon is threatened by deforestation and degradation implying in 
reductions on the provision of these.
According to economic theory, as ecosystem services are positive externalities and public goods, agents do not 
take into consideration the costs and benefits of their consumption and production of ecosystem services into their 
economic decisions. To address this problem payment for ecosystem services – PES – emerged, aiming to provide 
a source of income to the poor people living in forest areas, stimulating them not to deforest, and making agents who 
are indebted with the nature pay for their overconsumption of ecosystem services.
There is still controversy about possible impacts of the instrument. This article accesses the potentials of PES 
to contribute to sustainable development in the Brazilian Amazon using the three goals related to sustainable 
development proposed by the ecological economics theory: efficient allocation, fair distribution, and sustainable 
scale.
The study shows that PES as a pure market approach is unlikely to solve neither the scale nor the distribution 
problems. Therefore, for PES to achieve sustainable development, markets for ecosystem services should first be 
constrained by a maximum sustainable scale. Then, measures should ensure fair distribution in second place. Only 
after these questions have been tackled, it is desirable that agents interact in the ecosystem services markets to lead 
to an efficient allocation of resources.
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IntroductIon
The Amazon forests are considered to have a high im-
portance for the humanity due to the ecosystem servic-
es it provides. Despite this relevance attributed to them, 
these forests are facing high rates of deforestation and 
degradation, posing a threat to the ecosystem service 
provision. The payment for ecosystem services – PES 
– is advocated as a tool to slow down deforestation at 
the same time it would provide the local poor people, 
living in these forests and lacking alternatives of life 
with extra income. In this context, this article aims to 
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analyze the potential contributions and limitations of 
PES to promote sustainable development in the Brazil-
ian Amazon.
The originality of this article is that few authors 
have analyzed the potential of PES to achieve not only 
efficient allocation and fair distribution, but also a sus-
tainable scale. This article applies some ecological eco-
nomics concepts created by Daly (1992) in the context 
of pollution trading permits to the case of the payments 
for ecosystems services. Daly argues that ecological 
economic policies should have three distinct objectives: 
efficient allocation, fair distribution, and sustainable 
scale. This article tries to assess the qualities and prob-
lems of PES in these three perspectives together. It is 
considered that an environmental policy will only be 
completely successful for sustainable development if it 
can address these three aspects jointly.
Another contribution of this article is to situate the 
PES instrument in the economic theory and analyze the 
stage of these markets relative to the internalization of 
the externalities suggested by Coase (both for consum-
ers and producers).
This article suggests that PES as a theoretical ap-
proach have a high potential to contribute to sustainable 
development in the sense that once competitive markets 
for ecosystem services are created, they will lead to an 
efficient allocation, ensuring the provision of ecosystem 
services at the lowest social costs.
It suggests, however, that for PES to contribute 
to sustainable development, before allowing the trad-
ing in the markets, the scale should be determined, i.e. 
the total amount of ecosystem services that should be 
provided. Therefore, international agreements should 
be achieved. After it, property rights for the ecosystem 
services – which are still positive externalities not con-
sidered in economic decisions – should be assigned to 
both consumers and producers. In other words, it must 
be defined what exactly are ecosystem services, how 
they are produced and who is going to produce them 
and pay for them. The way this definition of the rights 
is made may be decisive to achieve the fair distribution 
with inter and intra-generational and international fair-
ness. Such a market is called by Daly (1999) not of a free 
market, but of a free market constrained by social, eco-
logical and ethical decisions.
This article is structured in six chapters includ-
ing this introduction. Chapter two provides an over-
view about the importance of the Brazilian Amazon 
with regard to the provision of ecosystem services to 
the humanity and the social, ecological and economic 
challenges it faces to achieve sustainable development. 
Chapter three introduces the definitions of ecosystem 
services, PES and the criteria for sustainable develop-
ment which will be used in the analysis of the PES in-
strument. Chapter four provides an overview about the 
methods used to write this article. Chapter five provides 
the results and discussion regarding the potentials of 
PES to contribute to sustainable development in tropi-
cal forest regions. Chapter six provides the conclusions 
and recommendations.
ecosystem servIces, the brAzIlIAn 
AmAzon, And the chAllenge of sustAInAble 
develoPment 
Ecosystem services and the Brazilian Amazon
Tropical forests play an outstanding role in providing 
ecosystem services to the humanity and the Amazon 
biome, as the largest area of tropical rain forests is key 
in providing ecosystem services to the humanity. The 
biome expands across 6.4 million km2 (Lentini et al, 
2005), accounting for approximately one third of the 
tropical forests worldwide. 63% of the whole Amazon 
Biome is in the Brazilian territory (Fig. 1). In Brazil, 
the Amazon biome extends through an area of 4 million 
km2. The federal states which contain Amazon forest in 
them form the political region “Legal Amazon”. This 
article refers to the Legal Amazon, whenever the Ama-
zon is mentioned.
Despite the high importance of the Brazilian Ama-
zon forests, the region faces the threat of deforestation 
and degradation which is occurring at an alarmingly 
pace. The most part of the deforestation occurs in the 
Amazon region especially in the southern and eastern 
edges, which is known as the “deforestation arc”. Large 
scale deforestation began in the 1960s and today 17% of 
the whole biome has been depleted (Lentini et al. 2005). 
This loss of natural capital has consequences for the 
provision of ecosystem services at the local, national, 
and global levels.
First, deforestation and degradation cause biodi-
versity loss. Biodiversity is essential to ensure tropi-
cal forests resiliency, being important for pest control, 
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pollination, propagation of seeds, among other (Burg-
er 1980, 1991). Biodiversity provide landscape beauty 
and is the basis for medicine. Moreover, is widely de-
fended to have value per se, even if it does not provide 
any benefit to humans. According to the Convention 
on Biodiversity, Brazil is one of 17 megadiverse coun-
tries in the world containing about 70% of the world’s 
catalogued animal and plant species. The process of 
forest loss occurring in the Amazon causes huge im-
pacts to biodiversity.
Fig. 1. The Amazon Biome (Lentini et al. 2005)
Second, the closed and dense Amazon forest plays 
a key role in the water cycles of the Amazon region and 
of several other regions as well. Half of the rainfall in 
the Amazon is likely to be recycled through the trees 
(Fearnside 2003). This vapor recycled in the Amazon is 
also transported to South and South-central Brazil, to 
Paraguay, Uruguay, and Argentina, and some crosses 
the Atlantic to Southern Africa (Fearnside 2005). These 
watershed functions are expected to be lost in great part 
when forests are converted into uses such as pasture 
(Fearnside 2005). The results of forest losses taking 
place in the Amazon, in addition to site related con-
sequences for rainfall, might incur drastic changes in 
precipitation in other parts of the continent and even in 
other continents.
Third, a characteristic of tropical forests is that they 
store carbon mainly within biomass instead of in the 
soil (FAO 2007). Hence deforestation and forest degra-
dation causes the emission of greenhouse gases to the 
atmosphere, especially when the forests are burned in 
order to convert the land into pastures or other types 
of agricultural land. The deforestation and land use 
changes taking place in the tropics are the second main 
source of CO
2
 emissions which are contributing to the 
acceleration of the greenhouse effect, coming right af-
ter the emissions from fossil fuels. In Brazil, the major 
cause of CO
2
 emissions is land use change, due to the 
deforestation and burning of forest areas. This phenom-
enon is responsible for not less than 75% of Brazil’s to-
tal emissions in the period 1990-1994 (MCT 2007). The 
Amazon biome was responsible in the period for 59% of 
all net emissions due to land use changes in Brazil at the 
time (MCT 2007).
Fourth, tropical forests are essential for protecting 
the soils from erosion, which occurs when the multilay-
ered forests do not protect the soils from heavy rainfalls 
and sun exposure. Forests on river banks protect the riv-
ers from being destroyed by sedimentation. Moreover, 
Amazonian soils, similarly to other tropical soils, are 
very dependent on forests to keep the fertility of the soil 
intact, as the soils in the region are up to 75% acid soils 
with low fertility and have very little capacity to store 
nutrients (Burger 2006).
Lastly, the Amazon forest is highly appreciated 
due to its characteristically beauty. The composition of 
tropical forests, huge and small rivers, and a mixture of 
populations and cultures makes the area an attraction 
for tourists from all over the world.
Because of these many functions, the tropical for-
est ecosystem encountered in the Amazon is highly 
important to the well being of humans at the local, re-
gional, and international levels. The broad process of 
devastation of these forests might incur impacts for 
global communities. However, despite consensus on the 
importance of the Amazon forests, other forces of eco-
nomic and social characters induce the destruction of 
the forest with consequences for the ecosystem services 
it provides. 
socIAl reAlIty of the PeoPle lIvIng  
In the AmAzon
In addition to the ecological problems, the Amazon 
region faces as well economic and social problems. In 
2004, 22.5 million people lived in the Legal Amazon, 
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corresponding to 12% of Brazil’s population. The de-
velopment stage of the Amazon region lags behind the 
development of the other regions in Brazil, with the 
only exception of the Northeast region, the Amazoni-
an GDP corresponding in 2004 to 64% of the Brazil-
ian mean (Calentano and Veríssimo 2007). The overall 
Human Development Index (HDI)1, which has income, 
health, and education as components, is also lower than 
that of other Brazilian regions with the exception of 
the Northeast. While the HDI of a developed country 
should vary between 0.8 and 12, and the mean HDI in 
Brazil in 2000 corresponds 0.766, the HDI in the Legal 
Amazon accounts for 0.705 (Calentano and Veríssimo 
2007), which is much lower than the Brazilian mean. 
This HDI characterizes the region as a mid-developed 
area in comparison to world standards (UNDP 2006). 
This index, however, does not capture the disparities of 
the development within the region. Two thirds of the 
population is urban and the HDI of these areas is higher 
than in the rural areas, where the stage of underdevelop-
ment is higher.
The World Bank forest strategy recognizes that 
over 90% of the 1.2 billion people living in extreme 
poverty depend on forests for some part of their liveli-
hood (World Bank 2004). These people are extremely 
prevalent within tropical forest regions. This is also the 
case in the Amazon. In this region the poverty rates are 
quite high, much higher than other regions in Brazil, 
with the exception of the Northeastern region.
The Amazon is characterized by a generalized lack 
of infrastructure: health, education, transports, etc, 
whereas rural areas are especially affected. The people 
there lack alternative occupations, access to markets, 
appropriate educational system, appropriate transpor-
tation system, and healthcare systems. The remoteness 
and lack of infrastructure tend to be strongly related to 
extreme poverty (Chomitz 2007).
1 “HDI provides a composite measure of three dimensions of hu-
man development: living a long and healthy life (measured by life ex-
pectancy), being educated (measured by adult literacy and enrolment at 
the primary, secondary and tertiary level) and having a decent standard 
of living (measured by purchasing power parity, PPP, income)” (UNDP 
2006).
2 The HDI ranges from 0 to 1. HDI from 0-0.499 characterizes an 
area as underdeveloped. HDI from 0.5-0.799 characterizes an area as 
middle developed. HDI from 0.8-1 characterizes an area as developed 
(UNDP 2006).
Although since the 90s there is no longer any of-
ficial colonization plan anymore, deforestation con-
tinues. In addition to the remaining subsidies (Burger 
2006), a new dynamic is driving it. One of the main 
problems that cause a barrier to sustainable develop-
ment in the region is the land tenure (Burger 2006). 
According to Lentini et al, from 1996 to 2005 the land 
property rights were defined as follows: 33% were 
protected areas, 10% were special areas (military land, 
land of traditional communities, rural settlements and 
environment protection areas – APAs); 24% were pri-
vate land; and 33% are land without land title (terras 
devolutas) (Fig. 2). In this last type of land tenure, the 
Estate has the right of disposal. However, any stake-
holder can occupy the land (posse) and, after years of 
use, can request the land title, which can then after-
wards be sold (Burger 2006).
Protected areas
33%
Special areas
10%
Private land
24%
"Terras devolutas"
33%
Fig. 2. Land tenure (Lentini et al. 2005)
current deforestAtIon drIvers
There are four main forces driving deforestation, which 
happen mainly (though not only) on the land without 
title – terras devolutas. First of all, conventional log-
ging (mainly unsustainable and illegal) causes much 
degradation to the forests. However, in contrast to 
commonly held beliefs, it is not the main cause of de-
forestation. In the logging process, only about 20% of 
the wood is made up of commercial species and uti-
lized for timber production. The rest of the vegetation 
is left, constituting secondary forests. The problem of 
the logging is the damage it causes. Logging activi-
ties impoverish the forests by extracting the valuable 
timber from it and by degrading the surrounding ar-
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eas where logging took place. The results of logging 
are damaged and impoverished forests and roads. The 
opened roads build by the loggers open the way for 
other deforestation actors.
Both roads left behind by the loggers, as well as 
roads that are built and asphalted as a result of gov-
ernmental infrastructure projects, enable the access to 
previously unreachable forests by other outsiders. This 
explains why small farmers have wider possibilities of 
advancing the agriculture frontier. Some of the wood 
that is still available is extracted from the forests and 
the areas are then burnt in a cheap and easy process for 
cleaning the land with almost no need of labor input. 
After that, farmers start agriculture based mainly on 
slash and burn practices for the cultivation of subsist-
ence products in small areas. The non-consumed part 
of the production is sold to contribute to the family in-
come. While the areas used for slash and burn agricul-
ture are mainly small (mainly up to 3 ha), the shifting of 
the cultivated area poses a deforestation threat if popu-
lation density is high.
Another typical activity which has spread very 
much in the last two decades is the cattle ranching activ-
ity. Cattle ranching is established either in an area where 
agriculture has been conducted or forests are converted 
directly into cattle ranching pastures. Many small farm-
ers3, as well as big farmers, conduct cattle ranching ac-
tivities in their properties. This activity, however, of-
fers alternative motivation for its use when compared 
to slash and burn agriculture. The cattle ranching ac-
tivities are highly profitable (Margulis 2003) and they 
bring gains which arise from land speculation (Romeiro 
1999, Fearnside 2005). Deforestation and the establish-
ment of cattle pasture is a cheap way to enable claims to 
public lands (Fearnside 2005).
There is also the combination of slash and burn 
with small scale cattle pasture, which has been spe-
cially endorsed by the Constitutional Fund for the 
Development of the North – FNO – and credits from 
the Amazon Bank – Basa – in the 1990s (Costa 2005, 
Burger 2006).
Moreover there is the conversion of forests, inde-
pendently of the logging activities, directly for the es-
tablishment of industrial agriculture, specifically soy in 
3 Small farmers in the Amazon are defined according to the Brazil-
ian Forest Code as familiar properties of up to 150 hectares.
the southern frontier of the state of Mato Grosso. This 
has been the main cause of deforestation pressure in the 
last years. Furthermore, there are also other pressures 
due to mining activities, plantation forestry, plantations 
for production of biodiesel, etc.
deforestAtIon vs. sustAInAble economIc 
And socIAl develoPment: boom-collAPse
The damages to the natural resources involved with 
deforestation do not lead to a sustainable social and 
economic development. A study from Calentano and 
Veríssimo (2007) confirms the boom-collapse hypoar-
ticle, first proposed by Schneider et al. (2000), which 
illustrates how the model of occupation in the Amazon 
based on natural resource degradation leads to rapid 
economic growth and enhancement of education and 
health indicators in the short term, but, in the long run 
is nonetheless unsustainable. The study shows how de-
grading activities promote neither economic nor social 
development in the long run apart from the damage it 
causes to the environment and the welfare loss caused 
by the falling of the provision of the ecosystem serv-
ices.
economIc ImPortAnce of the AmAzon
The Brazilian Amazon is an area rich in forest and other 
natural and mineral resources, which gives it very high 
economic importance for the local, as well regional 
and national, society. It has large reservoirs of min-
ing resources, water, is a source of raw materials and 
can be a source of land for the expansion of agriculture 
production to supply to other regions in Brazil, or for 
exportation. Soy, which has been expanding especially 
in the state of Mato Grosso (causing deforestation), is 
Brazil’s most important export product, playing a key 
role for the stabilization of Brazilians’ external trade ac-
counts (Becker 2005). Despite of this, the contribution 
the region makes to the national GDP is very low. The 
Amazon, despite accounting for more than 50% of the 
total country’s land area, only contributes to 8% of the 
national GDP (Calentano and Veríssimo 2007). 
For the local economy, particularly in rural colonies 
and native settlements, forests play a crucial role, fur-
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nishing the main source of the populations’ livelihood, 
including food, water, housing materials, other forest 
products, and land for agriculture.
Although the illegal activities occurring in the area 
incur a loss of tax revenues as enunciated by the World 
Bank (2004), the conservation choices might also be 
very costly to the nation. Monitoring and enforcing the 
law in the region is extremely costly and difficult to en-
sure. In addition to the difficulty posed by the vast land 
area, illegal groups acting in the area such as illegal log-
gers, big land speculation actors, and mining companies 
have much power, expressed by the high violence rates 
in the region (Calentano and Veríssimo 2007).
Apart from the direct costs of monitoring and en-
forcing, conservation may incur opportunity costs re-
lated to the use of the natural resources (timber, mining 
resources, water resources) or the land for economic ac-
tivities, such as agriculture and cattle ranching. There-
fore, it is likely that the region will not be conserved 
unless the maintenance of the forests evolves to be eco-
nomically attractive. According to Joao Paulo Capobi-
anco, executive secretary of the Ministry of the Envi-
ronment, it is the lack of economic alternatives which 
lead to deforestation and degradation (Estado de Sao 
Paulo, 15/08/2007). For him, sustainable development 
for the Amazon means finding ways of using the forests 
sustainably and providing economic gains through con-
servation choices, so that the development in the region 
is not inhibited. 
the chAllenge of A sustAInAble 
develoPment strAtegy for the AmAzon
The Brazilian Amazon is in critical need of a sustain-
able development strategy that will enhance the eco-
nomic gains in the region and nation, while at the same 
time provide social development for its population and 
avoid the devastation of the forests and the existing nat-
ural capital, which provide ecosystem services for the 
whole humanity.
The old policies in the region composed mainly 
by fiscal incentives and subsidized credits, benefici-
ated the expansion of industrial agriculture and cattle 
ranching. These policies had a homogenization char-
acter (Becker 2005). It did not consider the region’s 
socio-economic and ecologic diversity and did not pro-
vide development alternatives and long term benefits 
for the weak and the poor. Moreover, they contributed 
to deforestation and degradation of the tropical forests, 
and the multitude of consequences that they had on the 
global communities. 
During the 90s the necessity of promoting a sustain-
able development which would be more adequate in the 
context of the region was recognized. Programs such as 
the Pilot Program for the Protection of the Tropical For-
ests implemented many alternatives for land use which 
would be ecologically and socially more appropriate in 
the context of the region. However, it is still necessary 
to spread these ideas and to try to guarantee independ-
ence from financial donor support.
Today, there is a broad consensus about the high 
value of the Amazon. Special attention is paid to the 
importance of the service that the tropical forest’s 
ecosystem provides. Therefore, it is important to find 
a strategy capable of maintaining the forest functions 
in the long-term and of avoiding irreversible losses. The 
ecosystem services of tropical forests, including the 
Amazon, should be protected. Now comes the challenge 
of how to make that happen.
It is unlikely that the vast resources available in 
the region will be protected if the costs of doing so are 
higher than the benefits. Thus, it is necessary to find 
alternatives which would provide economic gains on 
the respective scale of every economic actor involved in 
decision-making regarding the use of the land, so that 
they actually choose to use the forests and natural re-
sources in a sustainable way. The benefits of preserving 
the forests should overweigh the costs (direct costs of 
protecting the forest plus the opportunity costs) at all 
levels of the decision making (Kremen et al. 2000).
The instruments used to conserve the forests un-
til today were mainly based on command and control. 
These, used isolated, have shown to be insufficient in 
ensuring the sustainable use of the forest and natural 
resources (May 2005).
The challenge is therefore how to combine preser-
vation of ecological integrity with social development, 
while at the same time finding ways of using the eco-
nomic potentials of the region in a sustainable way, and 
thus considering the three pillars of sustainable devel-
opment.
Folia Forestalia Polonica, series A, 2009, Vol. 51(1), 91–119
Can payments for ecosystem services contribute to sustainable development in the Brazilian Amazon? 97
the PAyment for ecosystem servIces As tool 
for sustAInAble develoPment
In this context, much attention has been given to eco-
nomic instrument payment for ecosystem services for 
its use in tropical forest regions. The instrument aims 
rewarding the local populations who deal with the land 
and natural resources in a more sustainable way by 
changing their land use towards more sustainable pat-
terns, by acknowledging such populations as providers 
of environmental services. The buyers of the services 
should be the consumers of ecosystem services either 
directly or indirectly. In this sense, markets for the serv-
ices would be created.
The idea is that the income flows enhance the value 
of the forest assets and thus encourage its conservation 
(ITTO 2004). In the Amazon this would mean that the 
local populations, who lack economic alternatives, have 
an extra incentive to adopt more sustainable land use 
practices. This would, on the one hand, provide the ru-
ral populations in the Amazon, who currently conduct 
slash and burn and cattle ranging activities, competitive 
alternatives for land use, and, on the other hand, pro-
vide extractives communities a complement to their re-
stricted income as reward for their sustainable land use 
patterns.
In Brazil in the year 2000, the social movement 
elaborated a proposal called Proambiente, a program 
with the goal of rewarding small rural farmers that 
changed their patterns of production to more environ-
mentally friendly systems than the current methods, 
which are causing environmental harm in the Ama-
zon. For instance, agro-forestry systems, agriculture 
without the use of fire, second forest enrichment, for-
est margins reforestation, are among others which are 
known to provide ecosystem services to the society. 
The idea of Proambiente is to make available econom-
ic alternatives to the rural people simultaneously en-
hancing the ecological values of the secondary forests 
and avoiding primary forests from being deforested 
for slash and burn or cattle pasture establishment. This 
program aspires stimulating the adoption of low-im-
pact land uses by small farmers in the Amazon region 
and reward the farmers for the provision of environ-
mental services.
In the next section some definitions will be intro-
duced and the economic problem related to the eco-
system services will be explained based on economic 
theory. Then, the instrument PES and its features will 
be introduced as a basis for the discussion of the re-
sults.
reseArch objectIve And theoretIcAl 
frAmeworK
Research objective
The research objective is to understand the possible 
contribution of PES to sustainable development in the 
Brazilian Amazon. The research objective is intended 
to be reached by answering two distinct research ques-
tions. 1. Can PES contribute to sustainable development 
in tropical forest regions? 2. Can Proambiente’s PES 
contribute to sustainable development in the Pole Rio 
Capim of Proambiente? This article focuses on the re-
sults related to the first research question.
In attempting to answer the questions posed, three 
broad economic goals related to sustainable develop-
ment proposed by the ecological economics theory will 
be used. They are: 1. efficient allocation; 2. fair distribu-
tion; 3. sustainable scale (Daly, 1992). In this regard, the 
research will try to access first, whether PES is capable 
to promote an efficient allocation of economic and natu-
ral resources amongst economic actors providing ag-
gregate maximum welfare economic and environmen-
tal gains in a society. Second, whether PES distributes 
the gains and losses in a fair manner between the actors, 
if it beneficiates weaker actors such as small farmers, 
extractives communities, and indigenous communities. 
Last, whether PES is an effective contribution to finding 
the sustainable scale of the economic system.
In the next section, the necessary ecological eco-
nomics background theory will be highlighted as well 
as the background definitions, which are considered 
necessary for the discussion of the results.
Theoretical framework
Ecosystem services and the role of tropical forests
An ecosystem is the functional unit where natural proc-
esses, i.e. the dynamic complex of interactions between 
plant, animal, and microorganism communities and the 
nonliving environment, take place (MEA 2005). The 
natural processes as well as biotic and abiotic com-
ponents of ecosystems have the capacity of providing 
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goods and services which satisfy human needs, either 
directly or indirectly. Based on the definition proposed 
by de Groot and others (2002), these capabilities are 
classified as ecosystem functions.
Once ecosystem functions are known and the con-
tribution of these functions to the society can be ac-
cessed, they are reconceptualized as ecosystem goods 
and services. In other words, ecosystem services are the 
ecosystem functions when human values are implied, 
being therefore an anthropocentric concept (de Groot 
et al. 2002).
There are different types of ecosystem services 
which can be divided, according to the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment (2005), in four categories: pro-
visioning, regulating, cultural, and supporting serv-
ices. Provisioning relates to the capacity of providing 
goods such as water, food, and timber. Regulating 
services are the natural processes that regulate the en-
vironmental conditions that sustain human life such 
as water cycles, flood control, and climate regulation. 
Cultural services relates to the importance of the eco-
systems in offering recreational, aesthetic, and spir-
itual benefitis. Finally, supporting services are those 
which are necessary for the other services to exist, 
such as nutrient cycling, soil formation, and photosy-
narticle (MEA 2005).
Ecosystem services from tropical forests
Forest ecosystems as the largest terrestrial ecosystem 
(FAO 2005) play a key role in providing ecosystem 
services to meet human needs. They regulate air qual-
ity, water flows, and climate. Moreover, they can store 
carbon, protect soils from erosion and landslides, pro-
vide habitat for animal species, and are a source of land-
scape beauty (MEA 2005).
Tropical forests ecosystems play an outstanding role 
in providing ecosystem services. This relies on the pe-
culiarities related to the ecology of these systems. First 
of all, they are the most biodiverse ecosystems in the 
world, providing habitat for a large variety of plant and 
animal species. Moreover, apart from the beauty they 
provide, they are an important carbon sink storing large 
amounts of carbon in the biomass; they protect the soils 
from erosion; and have watershed functions. 
Not only primary forests are capable to provide 
ecosystem services. Forest ecosystem services can also 
be provided by trees within more complex landscapes 
(Landell-Mills and Porras 2002). The levels of the pro-
vision of ecosystem services are directly related to the 
land uses or forest management practices conducted in 
forest land.
While the conversion of forests into agricultural 
land or pasture becomes for instance a source of carbon 
dioxide and loss of biodiversity, afforestations and re-
forestations have the potential to store carbon in the bi-
omass and complex agro-forestry systems can provide 
shelter for fauna therefore protecting biodiversity, and 
also maintain nutrient cycles similarly to that of a tropi-
cal forest, thus protect the soil fertility in the long run. 
Hence, not only forest protection but also sustainable 
forest management, agro forestry systems, and enrich-
ment of secondary forests, contributes to maintaining or 
providing ecosystem services.
the PArAdIgm of sustAInAble develoPment 
The sustainable development paradigm has been 
signed by 178 countries during the United Nations 
Conference on the Environment and Development 
(UNCED) in 1992 held in Rio. While the paradigm 
does not provide a concrete development path with 
concrete measures to be undertaken, it is essential 
for guidance in the decision processes with develop-
ment patterns to be adopted by providing orientation 
principles. These orientation principles should guide 
the actions of the actors in order to achieve sustain-
able development. These principles are 1. Economic 
efficiency; 2. Social fairness, and; 3. Prudent use of 
resources (Burger 2005). In this master article, based 
on ecological economics theory, the paradigm of sus-
tainable development will be translated into three 
broad economic goals: efficient allocation, fair distri-
bution, and sustainable scale (Daly 1992). Below these 
economic goals and their relation with the ecosystem 
services from forests will be explained.
Efficient allocation
Firstly, efficient allocation means the ability of allocat-
ing resources between demand and supply to maximize 
the social gain in the economy. Regarding ecosystem 
services, it means to provide the expected levels of eco-
system services demanded by society at the lowest so-
cial costs.
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Theoretically, the best instrument to achieve an effi-
cient allocation is a competitive market. However, mar-
kets fail to allocate the ecosystem services adequately, 
causing a tendency towards the undersupply of ecosys-
tem services, thus, resulting in welfare losses. This is 
due to the nature of ecosystem services as externalities 
and public goods and will be discussed below.
Fair distribution
Secondly, fair distribution refers to a distribution which 
reduces the degree of inequality amongst the division of 
resources to certain levels considered acceptable in the 
society. Following Daly (1999) and the principles of the 
Rio declaration, signed in 1992, a fair distribution is based 
on three pillars: inter-generational fairness, intra-genera-
tional fairness, and international fairness (Daly 1999).
According to the Brundtland Report and the con-
sensus achieved at the UNCED held in Rio, inter-gener-
ational fairness means that the use of natural resources 
today should not diminish the next generations’ access 
to resources. Inter-generational fairness in the forestry 
field, for instance, is expressed by the sustainable for-
estry yield concept, which was traditionally defended 
by foresters, of using yearly only so much from the for-
ests as the yearly incremental growth, therefore main-
taining the stock.
Intra-generational fairness means an overall lower 
inequality in not only the division of material, but also 
of information and capability resources between the con-
temporary generations. Therefore it is necessary as a first 
step, to address the poverty issue which has been empha-
sized in the Rio conference by the Principle Five of the 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development:
“All states and all people shall cooperate in the es-
sential task of eradicating poverty as an indispensable 
requirement for sustainable development, in order to 
decrease the disparities in standards of living and bet-
ter meet the needs of the majority of the people of the 
world”. 
In the forestry field, for instance, it has been identi-
fied that forests are an essential source of food, shelter, 
medicine, raw materials, and well being for many poor 
people in the world. According to the World Bank For-
est Strategy 2004, forest resources contribute directly to 
the livelihood of up to 90% of the 1,2 billion extremely 
poor people in the world. If their use leads often to the 
depletion of natural resources it is often due to lack of 
alternatives. Thus, to reduce poverty would mean for 
them to expand their alternatives, their life chances as 
defended by Sen (Hauptmeier 2006)4.
Regarding the environmental resources, intra-
generational fairness refer to a lower inequality in the 
division of the use of natural resources or ecosystem 
functions, in other words the inequality in the division 
of the quantity of damage to the environment one per-
son can make.
International fairness refers to the fairness between 
nations. In Rio the historical responsibility of industri-
alized countries towards natural resources depletion, 
their higher capabilities and, disposal of funds and tech-
nologies in order to address the environmental problems 
have been recognized. As a consequence, industrialized 
countries should provide the leadership and make avail-
able to developing countries financial and technologi-
cal resources, besides assuming more commitments in 
natural resources recovering because of their historical 
responsibilities and bigger share of environmental dam-
age they cause to the environment. This is the rationale 
behind the Principle Seven of the Rio Declaration on 
Environment & Development where it is accepted that 
the countries have “common but differentiated respon-
sibilities”:
“States shall cooperate in the spirit of global part-
nership to conserve, protect and restore the health and 
integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the dif-
ferent contributions to global environment degradation, 
states have common but differentiated responsibilities. 
The developed countries acknowledge the responsibil-
ity that they bear in the international pursuit of sustain-
able development in view of the pressures their societies 
place on the global environment and of the technologies 
and financial resources they command” (University for 
Peace 2002).
4 Following Sen.’s concept, to reduce poverty and provide develop-
ment requires transforming the available resources in freedoms, which 
could expand people’s life chances. The most important freedoms are to 
run a long and healthy life, to have access to education, and to have some 
appropriate life standards.
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Sustainable scale
Scale is the size of the economic system and might be 
thought as the product of the population times the per 
capita resource use (Daly 1992). A sustainable scale is 
one in which the total volume of resource flow is not 
higher than what natural ecosystems can regenerate and 
recycle. In other words, a sustainable scale is one that 
maintains the carrying capacity of the ecosystems over 
time, thus considering the intergenerational fairness, 
and avoids irreversible losses.
Important to point out is scale was not recognized 
officially in economic mainstream theory (Daly 1992). 
It considers that the economic system should not be re-
stricted by ecological limits. It is expected that technol-
ogy and trade is able to expand carrying capacity infi-
nitely (Rees 1996).
Alternatively, ecological economics recognize that 
humans remain in a “state of ‘obligate dependence’ on 
the productivity and life support services of the eco-
sphere” (Rees 1990 cited in Rees 1996). Therefore, the 
maintenance of the productivity of ecosystems, which 
in turn provide many life support services, here eco-
system services, is fundamental for life on earth (Rees 
1996).
While it is not possible to determine the exact figure 
about what is the carrying capacity of the earth, a didac-
Tab. 1. Biocapacity by component (Global Footprint Network 2007)
 
 
Population
Total
Biocapacity
Biocapacity by ecosystem
Cropland
Grazing 
land Forest
Fishing 
grounds
Forests  
(% of total
biocapacity)
(millions)
(global ha/
person)
(global ha/
person)
(global ha/
person)
(global ha/
person)
(global ha/
person)
World 6.301,5 1,8 0,53 0,27 0,78 0,14 44%
High income countries* 955,6 3,3 1,10 0,19 1,48 0,31 45%
Middle income countries** 3.011,7 2,1 0,50 0,31 1,05 0,15 51%
Low income countries*** 2.303,1 0,7 0,31 0,17 0,12 0,05 17%
Africa 846,8 1,3 0,37 0,51 0,27 0,08 21%
Asia-Pacific 3.489,4 0,7 0,34 0,08 0,17 0,11 22%
Latin America 535,2 5,4 0,70 0,96 3,46 0,21 64%
Middle East and Central Asia 346,8 1,0 0,46 0,27 0,11 0,08 11%
North America 325,6 5,7 1,87 0,28 2,68 0,43 47%
European Union (EU25) 454,4 2,2 0,82 0,08 1,02 0,12 46%
Rest of Europe 272,2 4,6 0,98 0,25 3,02 0,26 66%
* High Income Countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium & Luxembourg, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea Republic, Kuwait, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America
** Middle-Income Countries: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Botswana, Bra-
zil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Gabon, 
Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,, Poland, Romania, Russia (and USSR in 1975), Serbia and Montenegro, 
Slovakia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela
*** Low Income Countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Rep, Chad, Congo, 
Congo Dem Rep, Côte d‘Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, India, Kenya, Korea DPRP, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova Republic, Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe
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tic calculation is provided by the Ecological Footprint 
Network, called biocapacity. According to this defini-
tion, biocapacity is 
“… the capacity of ecosystems to produce useful 
biological materials and to absorb waste materials gen-
erated by humans, using current management schemes 
and extraction technologies. “Useful biological materi-
als” are defined as those used by the human economy 
(…). The biocapacity of an area is calculated by multi-
plying the actual physical area by the yield factor and 
the appropriate equivalence factor. Biocapacity is usu-
ally expressed in units of global hectares” (Global Foot-
print Network, 2007).
Following, biocapacity can be defined for the pur-
pose of this article as the area of ecosystems which 
provide needed ecosystems goods and services for 
humans considering the current levels of technology 
available.
The Ecological Footprint Network also estimated 
the availability of biocapacity per capita in the world and 
determined the components that contribute to this bio-
capacity (Tab. 1). Forest ecosystems account to a large 
amount of this biocapacity level. Considering the world 
mean, it responds to 0.78 hectares of the 1.8 hectares 
(or 43%) available per person. In Latin America forests 
have even a more important role responding to 64% of 
the biocapacity available.
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Fig. 3. Demand versus biocapacity (Global Footprint Network 
2007)
Following, the area of productive land required to 
produce the resources consumed and to assimilate the 
wastes produced is called in this sense the ecological 
footprint.
Figure 3 shows how the world population under the 
current consumption patterns is using more than the 
carrying capacity, the biocapacity.
forest vAlues And ecosystem servIces 
vAlues
Forests’ total economic value
The concept of the total economic value aims to ac-
cess the contribution of forest ecosystems to human 
economic welfare systematizing the economic value of 
the marketed, as well as the non-marketed values a for-
est ecosystem provides to humans. It thus expresses 
the aggregate value of benefits the forest provides to 
humans, hence the ecosystem goods and services from 
the forests. 
The total economic value of a forest is the sum of its 
instrumental and the non-use values5 as intrinsic values 
cannot be captured in monetary units. Instrumental val-
ues consist of direct, indirect, and option values. On the 
one hand, direct use values are those from which agents 
benefit directly through the direct use in the form of 
goods, such as timber and non-timber forest products, 
and services, such as landscape beauty for tourisms ac-
tivities and recreation. On the other hand, indirect use 
values are functions of the forests which people use or 
beneficiate of indirectly, for example climate regula-
tion, carbon storage, maintenance of water cycles. Op-
tion values relates to the value given to leave an option 
open to use the forests in the future (Oesten and Roeder 
2002). An example is the value given to conserve the 
biodiversity in the expectation that it can be used for 
medicinal purposes in the future.
The non-use values are values given by an agent, 
even though he is not taking part of the use himself. 
They are divided in two categories: existence and be-
quest values. The existence value is the value given by 
humans for something to exist, independently of the 
direct use of it. Examples are the importance given by 
5 For a detailed explanation about the forest value types, see Oesten 
and Roeder (2002).
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people to know that a cultural memorial or a seldom bi-
otope is conserved, even if they know they will never 
go there. Bequest values relate to the wish to keep the 
forests values so that next generations can profit from it 
(Oesten and Roeder 2002) (Fig. 4).
The economic value of forests’ ecosystem 
services and the Amazon
To quantify the total economic value of all forest eco-
systems is a complicated task, especially with regard to 
the valuation of the non-marketed forest values. Such 
a research has several limitations and therefore, few 
studies have attempted to do it. Here one of these stud-
ies will be introduced to give a first estimation about 
the economic contribution of the ecosystem services to 
the humanity. 
Costanza and other authors (1997) reviewed 
a number of nature’s services valuations and estimat-
ed, based on some additional own calculations, the 
minimum economic flow values of important general 
ecosystem goods and services, including marketed as 
non-marketed, which are provided to humans. One of 
the ecosystems assessed was the forests, which were di-
vided in temperate and tropical forests. Such a calcula-
tion, similar to models, is based on many assumptions 
and the power of the numbers is limited. 
The calculations are based mainly on direct or indi-
rect willingness to pay valuations. It considered values 
such as direct use values (food production, raw mate-
rials, recreation, and cultural), indirect use values (cli-
mate regulation, erosion control, nutrient cycling, waste 
treatment, etc.), option values (genetic resources, and 
habitat/ refugia), existence values (cultural, and habitat 
refugia), among others.
According to this estimate, the entire biosphere 
provides the humanity from US$ (1994 prices) 16 to 
54 trillion (1012) in ecosystem goods and services per 
year, or on average US$ 33 trillion. This was almost two 
times the global gross national product at the time of the 
study, calculated at US$ 18 trillion. The average eco-
nomic value of ecosystem services corresponded to 1.8 
times the global gross national product.
The economic value of forest ecosystems goods 
and services accounted, according to their estimations, 
for US$ 4.7 trillion (1994 prices). From this total, eco-
system goods and services from tropical forests were 
valued as US$ 3.8 trillion, 81% of the total value of 
all goods and services provided by forests worldwide 
considered in the study. The estimation of the value 
produced by a tropical forest per hectare corresponded 
on average to US$ 2000 per year. Excluding the goods, 
the economic value of only services corresponds to 
US$ 1652 per year per hectare. Multiplied by the glo-
bal area of tropical forests ecosystems the services 
provided annually by tropical forests can be estimated 
in US$ 3.1 trillion. For the majority of these services 
there are no markets.
The research emphasizes that, due to the limitations 
of the study, this should be considered minimum esti-
mations as there is still data for services missing and 
improvement is still needed in the valuation of various 
non-marketed goods and services.
In this context, if tropical forests are so important 
to the humans, why are these ecosystems under threat? 
The problem relies on the fact that several benefits the 
forests provide to humans in form of ecosystem goods 
and services are not considered in economic decisions. 
This relies on the fact that many goods, especially the 
forest ecosystem services, do not find markets, and 
therefore do not have a price determined by the demand 
and offer dynamic. For instance the existence value, the 
option value, many of the indirect values and even some 
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• Wind protection
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  of  water cycles 
• Biodiversity for
   Bioprospecting 
• Conserved
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• Endangered
  species 
• Habitats 
• Habitats
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Total economic value
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Indirect use
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Fig. 4. Concept of the forests’ total 
economic value (Oesten and Roeder 
2002, Landell-Mills and Porras 
2002)
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of the direct values (such as landscape beauty) do not 
have a price in the markets. Consequently, the benefits 
they provide are often not considered in economic de-
cisions. This lack of consideration happens even when 
many of the ecosystem services are essential to human 
life on the planet. This often leads to the depletion of 
the natural capital and consequently to the ecosystems 
services loss, causing huge harm to the world society. 
The next section will present the theoretical economic 
explanation for this problem.
suPPly tendency of forest ecosystem 
servIces through economIsts glAsses
Above it has been highlighted how forest ecosystems 
provide quite a few economic benefits in form of eco-
system goods and services for the whole humanity and 
that tropical forests are especially valuable with respect 
to ecosystem services. The provision of forest ecosys-
tem services is directly related to the forest manage-
ment activities adopted. If, on the one hand, sustainable 
forest management activities, agro forestry systems 
and forest protection ensure the provision of ecosystem 
services, on the other hand, deforestation, degradation, 
and conversion of forests turn to be a negative provider 
of these services.
But if tropical forest ecosystem services are so val-
uable for the humanity, why are these ecosystems, the 
ones capable of providing the services, under threat? If 
more sustainable forest management regimes provide 
humans with more welfare, why do unsustainable sys-
tems remain and cause pressure of destruction of for-
ests? This section will show the reasons why this hap-
pens.
Economic profitability of sustainable forest 
management activities
The income sources of sustainable forest management 
activities still rely strongly on the marketed direct use 
values of the forests, mainly on timber selling. The 
problem here relates to the long term characteristic of 
the activity, contrasting with the peoples preferences 
for present satisfaction. The impacts for forestry of this 
tendency of people to value more present than future 
consumption has already been demonstrated by Pigou 
(1920).
“A number of other large undertakings, such as 
works of afforestation or water supply, the return to 
which is distant, are similarly handicapped by the slack-
ness of desire towards distant satisfactions. This same 
slackness of desire towards the future is also responsi-
ble for a tendency to wasteful exploitation of Nature’s 
gifts. Sometimes people will win what they require by 
methods that destroy, as against the future, much more 
than they themselves obtain.” (Pigou, 1920).
This preference for the present satisfaction against 
the future satisfaction is also the basis for the dis-
counting, which is used to calculate the profits of for-
estry activities. Samuelson (1976), in his analysis of 
the famous Faustmann formula of 1849, showed how 
from an economic perspective, at positive realistic in-
terest rates, there should be no sustained forest yield in 
native forests, and no sustainable forest management 
as defended by foresters. Because of the long rotation 
periods for timber production and the compound inter-
est applied in the economy, the forest activities which 
depends mainly on timber selling are not competitive 
in comparison to other economic activities. He con-
cludes that in a laissez-faire economy, the low profit-
able forest activity will not exist, unless government 
keeps the responsibility to manage or protect them for 
the society’s welfare.
“We have seen that the rotation age in the virgin 
forest is greater than what competitive enterprise will 
countenance. Indeed, where it not that, so to speak by 
accident, historical governments own much timber 
land, there would be even fewer trees in North America 
today. Our analysis warns that applying what is sound 
commercial practice to government’s own utilization of 
public forests, or what the same thing, renting out pub-
lic land to private lumbering interests at the maximum 
auction rent competition will establish – this is a sure 
prescription for future chopping down trees” (Samuel-
son 1976).
Thus although activities such as forest protection, 
sustainable forest management and forest enrichment 
ensure the provision of ecosystem services from forests 
which are highly valued by the society, non-sustainable 
land uses remain. From an economic perspective, these 
is due to the lack of consideration of several values (es-
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pecially indirect use values, the option, existence and 
bequest values) in the calculus of decision agents. Be-
low, it will be explained why these indirect effects of 
a forest sustainable activity are not taken into consid-
eration in the economic agents valuations.
Externalities, public goods, and market failure
Many of the ecosystem services forests provided to the 
society do not find a market. Thus these benefits for the 
society do not become financial benefits for the provid-
ers of the services and these, in taking their decision 
about which land use to adopt, do not consider these 
benefits in the valuation they conduct in the decision 
process about land use alternatives. The reason for this 
problem is explained below.
Forest ecosystem services are characterized from 
an economic perspective as positive externalities (Lan-
dell-Mills and Porras 2002; Campos et al. 2005). Ex-
ternalities are non-intentional effects that arise from 
the production or consumption choice of an economic 
agent. They can be either negative, such as the effluents 
released as a by-product from a chemical company’s 
production, or positive, such as the ecosystem services 
that are provided through the sustainable management 
of a forest or its protection. 
In addition, forest ecosystem services have the na-
ture of public goods, being a special class of externali-
ties. These are identified by its non-excludability and 
non-rivalry properties. The first property denotes the 
impossibility (or for the prohibitively expensive pos-
sibility) of excluding someone from benefiting from 
ecosystem services. The second refers to the absence 
of competition in the consumption of the services. Due 
to these characteristics there is an absence of property 
rights to the ecosystem services (Fig. 5).
Accordingly, a free-rider dilemma arises. Although 
agents enjoy and value the consumption of the ecosys-
tem services, since they cannot be excluded from en-
joying the service and in addition the competition do 
not diminish the benefits they obtain from the services, 
individuals do not have an incentive to pay for them. 
They expect others to pay for the services and that they 
can consume them anyway. 
Consequently, the willingness to pay tends to zero 
(Landell-Mills and Porras 2002). As market prices are 
the market signals that drive the economic decisions of 
producers and consumers in an economy, if the prices 
do not reflect the scarcity of the goods and services, 
there is thus a disturbance in the market systems (Pig-
ou 1920, cited after Costanza et al. 2001: 45). There is 
though a failure in the caption of financial benefits of 
providing ecosystem services by forest owners and pro-
ducers (ITTO 2004). In the case of the ecosystem serv-
ices from forests, this disturbance causes the tendency 
for undersupply of the services. As a result, despite the 
high economic value of the forest ecosystem services 
contributing to the societies’ welfare, the existing de-
mand for the services is not reflected in the existence of 
a market and in the price system.
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Fig. 5. Demand curve for ecosystem services (Costanza et al. 
1997)
All in all, consumers benefit from the provision 
but do not pay for the consumption. And producers 
do not get paid and do not have incentives to produce 
more ecosystem services. As a result, unsustainable 
land uses have a competitive advantage against sus-
tainable land uses. Thus, individuals do not have in-
centives to invest in protection, establishment and sus-
tainable management of forests, with the aim to pro-
duce ecosystems services, which consequently leads 
to a lack of ecosystem services supply. This consists in 
a market failure where markets do not allocate forest 
goods and services in an efficient way. It is thus neces-
sary that governments intervene in the markets so as to 
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avoid overuse of the forests and undersupply of forest 
ecosystem services.
deAlIng wIth the mArKet fAIlure relAted 
to the ecosystem servIces
To solve the market failure related to the tendency of 
undersupply of ecosystem services, instruments of en-
vironmental policy emerge. There are two main groups 
of instruments which governments can use: command 
and control and economic instruments.
Command and control are regulatory instruments 
which determine the technical parameter for the eco-
nomic activities in order to achieve the expected goals 
of the policy (Seroa da Motta 2005). Examples of com-
mand and control instruments are rules and laws that 
establish the level of pollutant gases companies are al-
lowed to emit and laws restrict deforestation, such as 
the law from the Brazilian Forestry Code that only au-
thorizes properties in the Brazilian Amazon biome to 
clear a maximum of 20% of forest cover to undertake 
other activities. The other 80% should be preserved as 
legal reserve (reserva legal) and cannot be used unless 
there is a forest management plan approved by the state. 
Generally each economic actor should achieve the same 
targets posed by command and control instruments, in-
dependently of their level of costs to do so (Seroa da 
Motta 2005). The non-fulfillment of the rules leads to 
sanctions. 
To implement command and control instruments it 
is necessary to have a well established state apparatus. 
Moreover, it is argued that the implementation is often 
costly to monitor and to enforce. In combating air pol-
lution in the USA, regulatory methods showed to be on 
average six times more expensive for the State to im-
plement than economic instruments as to achieve the 
same goals of the environmental policy (Tientenberg 
1990, cited after Barde and Smith 1997). In a world 
where States face financial budget constraints, there is 
a tendency to search for less costly instruments (ITTO 
2004).
Alternatively, economic instruments modify the 
structure of costs and benefits of alternative actions 
open to economic agents (OECD 1994). They aim to 
change the relative profitability of the diverse economic 
activities in order to influence decision-making and be-
havior with regards to the environmental impact so as to 
achieve the policy goal. In comparison to the command 
and control instruments, they are more flexible in the 
sense that they allow agents some freedom in deciding 
how to respond to certain stimulus in a way that it is 
more beneficial for them (OECD 1994). Hence, they are 
more efficient and generate a better allocation among 
agents.
This is based on the concept of internalization of 
the externalities. This means that economic agents 
should incorporate either costs or, in the case of eco-
system services, the benefits of activities with envi-
ronmental impacts to their decisions. Two main alter-
native approaches to internalizing externalities can be 
distinguished, the “pigouvian” and the “coasean” (Daly 
1999).
On the one side, the Pigouvian approach suggests 
the imposition of taxes or subsidies so as to compensate 
the environmental cost or the benefit (Pigouvian Tax). 
This tax should correct the gap between social cost (or 
benefit) and private cost (or benefit) (Daly 1999).
On the other side, Coase advocates for definition 
or redefinition of property rights to the externalities so 
that later bargaining among private citizens will lead to 
the incorporation of formerly external costs in decisions 
(Daly 1999). Through this concept, for example, a pol-
lutant chemical company would need to consider the 
costs for cleaning the water before releasing it to the wa-
ter flows to the price of its products, thus internalizing 
negative externalities of the chemical industry activity, 
whereas a sustainable timber company could add the 
benefits that arise from the sustainable forest manage-
ment to its timber selling prices or would sell directly 
the ecosystem services resultant from the sustainable 
forest management activities. In undertaking this, they 
internalize the positive externalities of the forest man-
agement activity. In both cases, property rights are con-
ferred to the environmental costs or benefits (cited after 
Costanza et al. 2001). 
Case advocates that the definition of property rights 
to externalities should make consumers pay for the 
consumption of them and producers to receive for the 
production of them. Once this supply and demand ap-
pears, ecosystem services’ consumers (in the example, 
the chemical company) and suppliers (the sustainable 
timber company) come together and ecosystem services 
are traded and a market for ecosystem services is es-
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tablished. Thus, since markets are considered the most 
efficient institutions for allocating resources, one would 
expect the outcome of the market transactions to maxi-
mize the aggregate social gain in a society – achieve-
ment of the environmental goal at the lowest possible 
costs (Felder 2001).
In the case of the ecosystem services from forests 
this would mean defining property rights to these, 
consequently creating markets for them and letting 
the services to be traded. In the production side, as-
signing property rights in this context mean defining 
ecosystem services to be produced and defining rules 
of production for them. On the demand side, it means 
defining that consumers should pay for the services 
they consume and how they should do it.
A hypothetical example could occur in the case 
of carbon sequestration. Regulation could define that 
a certain area of forest binds certain amounts of carbon. 
A family living in a forest area and which makes sure 
this area is preserved instead of burnt could arise as 
supplier of carbon credits and should get paid for it. On 
the other side of the chain, a company which emits car-
bon as by product of its production may have to buy the 
sequestration of carbon if it exceeds the emission levels 
allowed by a certain regulation. The company would be 
the buyer of the ecosystem services6. This approach has 
been discussed in the last few years as the most efficient 
solution to address the problem of the provision of eco-
system services. This is the background of the idea of 
the payment for ecosystem services.
PAyments for ecosystem servIces
Payment for Ecosystem Services – PES – aims to ad-
dress the market failure regarding ecosystem servic-
es, characterized by the lack of interest in sustainable 
forest and land use management activities and hence 
the tendency for undersupply of ecosystem services 
from forests due to lack of economic incentives to 
provide these positive externalities. PES expects to 
change the structure of incentives so as to influence 
the relative profitability of these economic activities 
by rewarding the producers which provide ecological 
6 Note: this is still a hypothetical example, as there are no markets 
for carbon coming from avoided deforestation yet.
benefits for the society (Campos et al, 2005). This way 
it should ensure the provision of ecosystem services 
in the society and provide the providers of sustainable 
land use activities with extra income, following the 
principle of the “protector receiver” (Born and Taloc-
chi 2005).
Background for PES
In the past, economic instruments of environmental 
policy have been mainly used to achieve reduction on 
the levels of pollution, effluents or environmental dam-
age, thus implemented in order to diminish the environ-
mental bad following the polluter pays principle (Seroa 
da Motta 2005). Through this concept polluters should 
bear the costs of pollution by implementing technolo-
gies with fewer environmental impacts, or by paying 
the government in form of taxes or charges for them 
to solve the environmental problem. Economic instru-
ments offered often the possibility for the pollution 
permits to be traded. Thus, polluters could buy permits 
from other economic agents who could reduce environ-
mental damage at lower costs.
Another type of instruments followed the principle 
of the common burden (Seroa da Motta 2005). Through 
governmental subsidies a strategic activity with essen-
tial environmental benefits was financed or the costs of 
handling environmental costs were taken by the gov-
ernment in order to achieve the goal of the environmen-
tal policy.
Today, especially in dealing with topics where the 
costs to revert an environmental damage might be too 
high, as expected for climate change, or the risks are too 
high, as in dealing with the biodiversity loss, a new ap-
proach emerges. The Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development calls the precautionary principle, in 
order to avoid irreversible losses. New approaches arise, 
aiming to beneficiate and support the environmental 
good following a new principle of the “protector receiv-
er” (Born and Talocchi 2005). The new idea is to reward 
providers and protectors of ecosystem services, paying 
for them to ensure the supply of ecosystem services for 
the society.
Considering the fact that people living in forest ar-
eas are often poor, the instrument also aim to promote 
better living standards for the rural and poor people, 
thus contributing to the sustainable development of ru-
ral forest areas.
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This is the rationale behind the payment for eco-
system services and it follows the proposal of the Coase 
Theorem of assigning property rights to the externali-
ties to solve the market failure (Felder 2001).
PES definition
Until this date, there is no established definition of 
PES, due to the initial stage of the schemes around 
the world and the high diversity of the experiences 
(Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; Campos et al. 2005, 
Wunder 2005). In this article the definition proposed 
by Wunder (2005) will be used. According to it, PES 
is described as:
“a voluntary transaction where1. 
a well-defined ES (or a land-use likely to secure that 2. 
service)
is being ‘bought’ by a (minimum one) ES buyer3. 
from a (minimum one) ES provider4. 
if and only if the ES provider secures ES provision 5. 
(conditionality)”
Wunder (2005) recognizes that in the PES schemes 
around the world, there are very few ones which accom-
plish all criteria and the schemes can thus be seen more 
as PES-like schemes. Nonetheless, the definition is use-
ful in order to differentiate the instrument from other 
instruments of environmental policy.
The voluntarily characteristic of PES differentiates 
it from command and control instruments (Campos et 
al. 2005) and presupposes that the suppliers have alter-
native land use choices (Wunder 2007).
 Moreover, in a PES scheme, the ecosystem serv-
ice has to be well defined. There must be a “product” 
than can be traded. In that case, the product need to 
be identified and should be able to be measured, for 
instance an additional ton of carbon stored. It can al-
ternatively be a land use which is likely to provide the 
product, for instance a piece of tropical forest conser-
vation protects the habitat for a specific animal. The 
definition of this product is necessary so that trading 
can take place. Landell-mills and Porras (2002) call 
these products the “commodities”. To define the com-
modity and bring it to the markets is one of the most 
challenging aspects of market creation (Landell-Mills 
and Porras 2002). Today, there are quite a few differ-
ent commodities to commercialize the environmental 
services. Often they were created by regulatory frame-
works such as the Kyoto Protocol and carbon credits. 
In addition, there must be buyers and suppliers for the 
services. In order to overcome the free-rider dilemma, 
regulatory frameworks, agreements are necessary, al-
though there are also volunteer contracts happening in 
the world. 
The last characteristic of the PES scheme is that the 
payment for the ecosystem service should be contingent 
to the provision of the service. 
Existing markets for ecosystem services and 
their drivers 
In a review of 287 cases, Landell Mill and Porras (2002) 
identified four types forest environmental services (here 
ecosystem services) which are being traded: 1. Land-
scape beauty; 2. Biodiversity protection; 3. Watershed 
protection; 4. Carbon sequestration and storage. Moreo-
ver, bundled services are also being traded.
The demand may be formed through private pref-
erences, such as the demand for landscape beauty or 
watershed protection, or public preferences such as 
for species protection (Wunder 2007). Demand may 
also be formed by regulations and agreements such as 
in the case of the carbon markets formed by the Kyoto 
Protocol. In contrast, the supply depends on the actors 
willingness to manage forests in a sustainable way, es-
tablish afforestations or reforestations, agro-forestry 
systems, and second forests enrichment so as to provide 
ecosystem services from forests.
PES schemes
PES schemes can assume different forms. There are 
three main categories which Wunder (2005) sug-
gests in categorizing them: 1. area vs. product based 
schemes; 2. public vs. private schemes; 3. use-restrict-
ing vs. asset building schemes. First, area based con-
tracts rewards an area with a certain land use type ca-
pable of providing ecosystem services while product 
based schemes relies on a “green” price premium for 
products or services which are certified to have envi-
ronmental friendly production patterns (organic fruit 
production) or which minimizes environmental dam-
ages (certified timber from reduced impact logging, 
tourism). 
Second, public schemes are described as those 
which the State coordinate the payment to the sellers 
of the ecosystem services being responsible to raise the 
funding to realize the payments. The State is an inter-
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mediary body which coordinates the mechanism. In 
contrast, in private schemes buyers and sellers of the 
ecosystem service have a contract directly.
Lastly, use restricting PES schemes, pay service 
providers for not undertaking usual activity with en-
vironmentally damaging impacts. Examples are sug-
gested payments for avoided deforestation, where it 
is suggested that communities living in forest areas 
which, for instance, forego their traditional slash and 
burn land use patterns are paid for the restriction to 
their possibilities of land use towards the protection 
of the ecosystem services. Alternatively, asset build-
ing schemes pay for ecosystem services sellers in or-
der that they enhance an ecosystem so that it provides 
a specific ecosystem services. Examples are payments 
for forest communities to enrich second forests with 
native timber species. While in the first case payments 
are mainly based on the opportunity costs a family 
incur in, it is paid for the net environmental benefit 
(Garcia et al. 2004).
Payment methods
The payment for ecosystem services can occur either 
through cash or non-cash. The non-cash payments can 
be made, for instance in form of development projects, 
technical assistance, building of infra-structure, etc. 
(Wunder 2005). Non-cash payment could be adequate 
in scenarios where local capacities for savings, invest-
ment, and entrepreneurship are limited.
methods
The research objective of the master article is to pro-
vide an overview about the contribution possibilities of 
the PES for the sustainable development in the Brazil-
ian Amazon and will be accessed through a literature 
review. The analysis of the PES schemes is made under 
the optic of the ecological economics theory, comple-
mented by a current literature review of the existing 
PES initiatives in the tropical forests.
results And dIscussIon
Can PES contribute to sustainable development 
in tropical forest regions?
Payments for ecosystem services have been imple-
mented in diverse tropical forest regions in the world. It 
is expected that PES can be a tool to promote develop-
ment in poor tropical forest areas at the same time that 
it conserve these high valued forests. 
Based on the theoretical background provided 
above, this section provides some reflections about the 
literature regarding the potentials of the PES to con-
tribute to sustainable development in tropical forest re-
gions. PES will be analyzed with regards to the three 
economic goals related to sustainable development pro-
posed above of efficient allocation, fair distribution, and 
sustainable scale.
Although PES schemes in implementation are not 
pure market instruments, this analysis will be based on 
the theoretical concept of PES as a market oriented ap-
proach to access the potentials and limitations of such 
an instrument.
Allocation
Coase (1960, cited after Felder 2002) advocates that de-
fining property rights to externalities and thus creating 
a market for them and let them to be allocated by the 
markets is the most efficient alternative to solve the ex-
ternalities problem. The relative prices determined by 
supply and demand on competitive markets will lead to 
an efficient allocation. According to the Coase theorem, 
under the assumption of no transaction costs, this mech-
anism allocates the property rights efficiently leading to 
maximum welfare gains, independently of the distribu-
tion of the property rights.
Here it is argued that, similarly to the trading pol-
lution permits, PES could provide a tool to reduce the 
costs to achieve the environmental goal through assign-
ing the property rights to the ecosystem services. Once 
there is a market for ecosystem services, the markets 
would allocate efficiently bringing those actors to pro-
duce the ecosystem services which have lower costs to 
do so.
Tietenberg (1993) shows the advantages of the ap-
plication of this approach to combat air pollution in 
the USA. There a cap for air pollution has been set and 
the firms were given pollution permits which could be 
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traded. This policy made industries which could control 
their emissions cheaply change their production pat-
terns to adopt new technologies and reduce emissions 
and sold their emissions credits. Other plants, which 
had higher costs to change their technologies to reduce 
their emissions did not change their patterns and bought 
pollution permits from other companies. Thus, with 
a limited number of emission permits, the emissions 
stayed under the level expected and achieved the goal 
at lower costs.
Chomitz (2007) shows how the carbon markets 
could achieve higher emission reductions at lower costs 
if the avoidance of deforestation would be considered 
in the carbon markets. He shows how already at modest 
carbon prices of USD 10 per ton, would make deforesta-
tion unprofitable in many land use systems in the tropics 
and could deter the conversion of 1 to 2 millions of Km2 
of forests by 2050, preventing the release of 8-15 billions 
of tons of CO
2
. He reminds that any action that keeps 
a ton of carbon out of the atmosphere has the same ef-
fect towards mitigating climate change, independently 
of where it is done. If this policy would bring on the one 
hand benefits for tropical countries with the consequent 
financial flow, with the lower prices related to the higher 
offer of carbon, countries could than have higher reduc-
tion targets at the same price.
It is here argued that PES schemes follow the same 
approach as proposed by Coase. Therefore, it should 
be expected that the PES can be a good tool to ensure 
ecosystem services supply through defining property 
rights to the ecosystem services, consequently creat-
ing markets for them, and letting them to be traded. 
This would lead the maximum welfare gains in the so-
ciety by produce the expected level of ecosystem serv-
ices at the lowest costs. Through the markets, once the 
price for the ecosystem services is determined, only 
those agents who have ecosystem services production 
costs lower than the market prices will produce, reduc-
ing the costs for the production of the environmental 
goal.
The current markets for ecosystem services from 
forests are though very incipient (Landell-Mills and 
Porras 2002). The definition of property rights require 
though first, that it becomes clear to what the property 
rights are being assigned, how many property rights, 
and to whom these shall be distributed. Differently 
than the carbon markets and the air pollution trading 
cited above, the definition of the property rights in the 
PES schemes lays far behind the above mentioned ex-
amples. 
First, there are still uncertainties regarding the rela-
tion between the forests and the levels of all ecosystem 
services it provides, regarding which land uses and for-
est management types provide which ecosystem serv-
ices. Moreover, it is still not clear who should confer the 
property rights to the actors. It is necessary to advance 
in this field for the markets to develop. 
In addition, the markets for ecosystem services 
from forests are driven by the buyers of the ecosystem 
services, mainly governments, private companies, and 
NGOs (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002). The prices in 
the markets are mainly determined by the willingness 
to pay of these actors. This does not solve the free riders 
problem related to the ecosystem services and the prices 
do not reflect the marginal benefit provided by the eco-
system services. It is still necessary to create demand 
to the ecosystem services and regulatory instruments 
might be needed such as happened in the Kyoto Proto-
col, where emission reduction targets were set.
Last, it is necessary to know how much of the ec-
osystem services are needed for human welfare. This 
question will be handled under the scale topic.
Important to consider is that market success may de-
pend on the support from a range of local hierarchical 
and cooperative institutions such as regulatory agencies, 
trading platforms, certifiers and insurers among other in-
stitutions (Chomitz 2007). These constitute some of the 
transaction costs existent in establishing such a market. 
Coase advocates that, in a world with transaction costs, 
the welfare gains will depend on the distribution of the 
property rights (Coase 1960, cited after Felder 2002). In 
this case, Coase argues that governments should be the 
best instance to assign property rights in order to achieve 
the maximum gains form the markets.
In conclusion, PES schemes have a high potential 
to provide an efficient allocation of ecosystem servic-
es. The efficiency depends however on the assignment 
of the property rights to the ecosystem services. PES 
schemes in forestry are still very incipient and should 
develop in this field thorough a higher understanding 
about the benefits forests provides to humans, the eco-
nomic benefits, through determining who are the con-
sumers of ecosystem services, and the quantity of eco-
systems services necessary for human well being.
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Distribution
Beyond the goal of efficient allocation, for PES to con-
tribute to sustainable development, it is necessary that 
it contributes to social fairness. Following the concept 
above, PES have potential to provide allocation benefits, 
however this does not mean that these benefits will be 
fairly distributed. The welfare enhancement mentioned 
by Coase is the result of the social benefits minus the 
costs, independently of if some actors have a greater 
share from the benefits and other from the costs. There-
fore, although assigning property rights to the forest 
environmental benefits and letting them to be traded 
will according to his theory enhance the aggregate well 
being in a society, the distribution of costs and benefits 
is not considered (Felder 2001, Daly 1999). Thus, while 
the approach is capable of maximizing the social gains, 
it is unclear if it is socially fair. It becomes clear that al-
location and distribution are two different problems that 
have to be tackled by two different instruments (Daly 
1999). It should therefore not be expected from PES that 
it will bring a fair distribution as an obvious outcome. 
Below the potential of PES to contribute to social fair-
ness is separated in: intergenerational, intrageneration-
al, and international fairness. 
Intergenerational fairness
The intergenerational fairness will depend on the eco-
logical sustainability provided by PES, in other words, 
if the instrument is capable of maintaining a level of 
ecosystem services for the actual generation without 
implying in a lack of ecosystem services for the next 
generations. It depends therefore more on the ecological 
impacts of the instrument than on the social fairness 
issue and thus will be discussed below under the scale 
topic.
Intragenerational fairness
In the last years, several scientists analyzed the potential 
impacts of PES systems with regard to the intragenera-
tional fairness, especially with regard to poverty reduc-
tion. Especially tropical forest regions were a concern 
because many poor people live there. 
The theory which advocates the definition of prop-
erty rights for the externalities already brought up the 
issue that the markets, although highly efficient to allo-
cate the property rights so as to maximize the aggregate 
welfare gains in a society is not the adequate instrument 
to ensure that the division of the gains and losses are 
fair. This problem was raised by Coase (1960) and Daly 
(1999) in an analysis about pollution trading permits.
Studies about PES schemes being implemented 
prove this reality. They suggest that it is very unlikely 
that those PES schemes which are focused on efficiency 
as primer goal will beneficiate poor and weaker actors 
instead of more powerful and richer actors (Landell-
Mills and Porras 2002, Wunder 2005, Alix-Garcia et al. 
2004).
In their study about three types of PES schemes 
in Mexican common property forests, Alix-Garcia et 
al. (2004) demonstrate how the most egalitarian PES 
scheme is also the less efficient in terms of environmen-
tal benefits per dollar paid. On the contrary, the scheme 
which aims to maximize the environmental benefits per 
dollar paid, in other words, the most efficient alloca-
tion, is the less egalitarian scheme. In designing a PES 
instrument, it should be clear that a trade-off between 
efficiency and distribution may exist as suggested by 
Alix-Garcia et al. (2004) and that to balance between 
these goals is necessary.
Studies pose the risks involved once the ecosystem 
services production turn to be an interesting economic 
activity, powerful groups can start to claim land of the 
poor to receive the payment for ecosystem services. 
This risk is especially high in tropics, where landown-
ership is usually not formalized, (ITTO 2004, Landell-
Mills and Porras 2002).
Moreover, ecosystem services markets pose other 
risks to poor people living in forest areas. Reminding 
that 90% of the poorest people depend on forests for 
their livelihoods, there is the risk that the PES restric-
tions endanger their food security and safety net (ITTO 
2004). Poor people may face also other constraints such 
as the lack of access to markets or the lack of capabili-
ties to deal with the emerging bureaucracy which these 
markets may require (ITTO 2004, Wunder 2005). Other 
complementary policies might be necessary in order to 
guarantee that the poor will beneficiate from the mar-
kets might be necessary such as enhancing capabilities, 
providing supportive institutions (Landell-Mills and 
Porras 2002). 
According to Chomitz (2007), it is the assignment 
of rights which will determine who wins and who loses. 
The solution to the deforestation and poverty issue in 
this case will revolve on the allocation and enforce-
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ment of rights. He suggests that “strong, equitable in-
stitutions” are necessary to deal with the social fairness 
problems. 
The issue regarding the distribution of property 
rights had already been raised by Daly (1992, 1999). 
According to him, PES in the sense of markets cannot 
solve the distribution problems per definition. How-
ever, it could beneficiate or not the weaker actors de-
pending on the initial distribution of ownership of the 
new assets. 
Governments need in this case to ensure the equity 
by providing the regulatory framework but especially 
by ensuring property rights of the poor so that the PES 
benefits the weaker actors more than the stronger (Lan-
dell-Mills and Porras 2002, Chomitz 2007).
International fairness
Fairness is also a problem in talking about wealthier 
and poorer nations. While interest for the PES systems 
surged also because of their potential to promote a fi-
nancial flow from the high income countries, mainly 
the ecosystem services consumers, to several middle 
and low income countries which are ecosystem services 
providers, it is still not clear whether the instrument will 
beneficiate the poorer more than richer countries.
Table 2 shows how high income countries consume 
per capita more than three times as much biocapacity as 
middle income countries and eight times as much bio-
capacity than lower income countries. Figure 6 shows 
the proportion each country is using from its national 
biocapacity and if the country is a biocapacity debtor or 
creditor. It shows that the main debtors of biocapacity in 
a national scale are mainly the higher income countries, 
the Middle East, China and India. 
Fig. 6. Ecological creditors and debtors (Global Footprint 
Network 2007)
The national use of the biocapacity is the relation 
between the average levels of per capita consume of bio-
capacity multiplied by the population and the country’s 
total available biocapacity (Global Footprint Network 
2007). Most of the European countries and the USA are 
consumers of biocapacity, consuming more than 50% 
beyond of what they have available. Canada, Australia, 
and Finland, despite having high levels of per capita 
Tab. 2. Per capita ecological footprint by country
Population
Total Ecological 
Footprint
Total Biocapacity
Ecological deficit (-)  
or reserve (+)
(millions) (global ha/person) (global ha/person) (global ha/person)
World 6.301,5 2,2 1,8 -0,5
High income countries 955,6 6,4 3,3 -3,1
Middle income countries 3.011,7 1,9 2,1 0,2
Low income countries 2.303,1 0,8 0,7 -0,1
Africa 846,8 1,1 1,3 0,2
Asia-Pacific 3.489,4 1,3 0,7 -0,6
Latin America 535,2 2,0 5,4 3,4
Middle East and Central Asia 346,8 2,2 1,0 -1,2
North America 325,6 9,4 5,7 -3,7
European Union (EU25) 454,4 4,8 2,2 -2,6
Rest of Europe 272,2 3,8 4,6 0,8
(Global Footprint Network 2007)
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consumption of biocapacity, are suppliers of biocapac-
ity as they consume nationally less than they have in 
biocapacity. This is due to the fact that these countries 
are very large, have many reservoirs of natural resourc-
es and are not dense. China and India are the opposite 
examples. They have a very low per capita use of bio-
capacity in comparison with the world mean; however, 
due to their huge populations they are overusing their 
national available biocapacity.
Based on the table 2 and on the figure 6 one can con-
clude that, with the expressive exceptions cited above, 
middle and low income countries are providing high 
income countries with biocapacity. As a consequence, 
would an ideal PES instrument exist, a flow of finan-
cial resources would go from richer to poorer countries, 
especially from Europe and the USA to Latin America 
and Africa.
In this context, PES could be a good tool to promote 
international fairness in case the countries would con-
sider the availability and the use of biocapacity, of which 
a great part are ecosystem services from forests (see sec-
tion 2), into their accounts. In this case, the nations could 
trade their exceeding biocapacity with countries which 
extrapolate their biocapacity. Countries in Africa, and 
Latin America with tropical forest areas would arise as 
ecosystem services suppliers together mainly with Rus-
sia, Canada and Australia, and some Asian countries and 
could raise funds for ensuring the provision of the eco-
system services from forests providing a financial flow 
from mainly richer to poorer countries. 
Accordingly, the USA, Europe, Middle East and the 
greater part of Asia would emerge as ecosystem serv-
ices consumers. The countries would than need to pro-
mote either a population policy, especially in the case of 
the far eastern countries, or a consumption restriction 
policy, especially in Europe and USA or would need to 
buy biocapacity from other countries. It is important to 
see that these assumptions require the existence of a set 
cap for ecosystem services use, an agreed scale of the 
economic system, as will be discussed in the following 
section.
The above mentioned perspective suggests the idea 
that there is a high potential for tropical countries with 
large forest areas in Latin America and in Africa, to 
be suppliers for ecosystem services, and thus to benefit 
from the selling of these.
Despite of this potential, studies show that in fact, 
the high income countries will be the ones to beneficiate 
at most from the ecosystem services markets. Bosello 
and Roson (1999, cited in Landell-Mills and Porras 
2002) estimated through a model the per capita eco-
nomic welfare benefits carbon markets will provide to 
the USA, the EU countries, China, and the rest of the 
world. Their estimation suggests that in a context where 
global trading and banking is permitted, the per capita 
welfare gains due to the carbon markets would achieve 
US$ 278 in the USA, US$ 305 in the European Union 
countries, US$ 6 in China and USD 12 in the rest of the 
world. In this model, the gains of the USA and EU with 
the trading, although they are the main emitters from 
CO
2
, are at least 23 times higher than that of the rest of 
the world. Although there are diverse assumptions be-
hind the calculations, it exemplifies that it is very likely 
that richer countries beneficiate more from the markets 
than the poorer ones, contradictory to the idea that the 
markets would beneficiate more developing countries as 
ecosystem services providers.
Scale
The question now is whether PES and the consequent 
creation of markets for the ecosystem services can con-
tribute to ensure that the economic systems guarantee 
a minimum level of ecosystem services maintaining the 
carrying capacity of the earth for this as well as for the 
next generations. In other words, if with PES the level 
of ecosystem services provided in the aggregate is the 
desirable one. 
The ecological pillar of the sustainable develop-
ment paradigm has not been analyzed as such in the 
literature reviewed. The ecological sustainability has 
been mainly analyzed as whether the implementation of 
PES promotes an efficient allocation by reducing defor-
estation at lower costs. It has not been assessed whether 
PES contributes so that a minimum level of ecosystem 
services is provided.
Some risks to the ecological effects though have 
been raised by Wunder (2005), Chomitz (2007), ITTO 
(2004). These authors posed the risks of the leakage ef-
fects in which the conservation could raise the prices 
of the products which are not being produced anymore 
(such as cattle) leading other actors to invest in the ac-
tivity. These effects can occur because of two problems 
of the markets, which are explained below.
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Landell-Mills and Porras (2002) raises the prob-
lem that the markets for ecosystem services from for-
ests today are still driven by demand, due to the non-
excludability of consumption of the majority of services 
provided. The prices depend on the buyers’ voluntary 
willingness to pay leading to prices which still do not 
express the marginal benefit of the actors in consum-
ing the ecosystem services. Ecosystem services from 
forests are thus not considered in the economic deci-
sion of the majority of the actors and it is unlikely that 
these markets will lead to the sustainable scale of the 
economic system.
Daly (1999) argues that the markets per definition 
do not solve the mentioned problem of achieving the 
sustainable scale of the economic system as the instru-
ment, as it is its aim. Here it is argued that the markets 
as such cannot lead to a sustainable scale of production 
of ecosystem services.
Therefore, as advocated by Daly (1999), before as-
signing property rights it is necessary at first to know 
the scale. This presupposes the questions: how many 
property rights should be assigned? What is the envi-
ronmental goal? Which ecosystem services from forests 
should be produced, at what quantity? Which leads to 
the question: which kinds of forests or forest manage-
ment areas are capable of providing these? Leading fi-
nally to the question: how much of the tropical forests 
should be conserved?
Daly (1999) defends the one advantage of the trad-
able permits instrument in that it enables the decision 
about the scale before the property rights are distribut-
ed. One example of such a market is the carbon market 
created by the Kyoto Protocol. This agreement between 
nations determined green house gases reduction targets 
for the Annex B countries and promoted instruments for 
emissions to be traded. The protocol thus determined 
the scale, distributed the responsibilities between the 
countries, and then let the markets allocate efficiently.
This approach could also be implemented for the 
other ecosystem from the forests, determining the mini-
mum forest areas that should remain to supply the eco-
system services expected.
The findings from the study demonstrate that the 
payment for ecosystem services as a market approach 
can contribute to sustainable development, however 
only if the markets are constrained by distributional and 
scale issues. Pure markets for ecosystem services are 
unlikely to solve the distribution and scale issues. 
As a market approach, PES is by definition the best 
instrument to allocate efficiently. However, it does not 
necessarily lead to a fair distribution. Therefore it is 
necessary that in the distribution of property rights, 
the poorer and weaker actors are considered and that 
extra policies ensure that they benefit from the mar-
kets.
These results show similarities to Wunder (2005), 
Chomitz (2007), Landell-Mills and Porras (2002), Alix-
Garcia et al. (2004). These authors showed how stronger 
actors may have a higher share of gain in these markets, 
in the absence of specific policies aiming a fairer dis-
tribution. Alix-Garcia et al (2004) show that most ef-
ficient PES schemes are also the less egalitarian ones, 
thus leading to a trade-off between the goals of efficient 
allocation and fair distribution.
The authors above illustrate that in the case of tropi-
cal forests, to ensure that the poorer and weaker actors 
benefit from ecosystem services markets it is necessary 
to ensure their right to land, their right to the ecosystem 
services, enable the access to the markets, provide the 
training and education necessary so that they can pro-
duce the ecosystem services and also that they can deal 
with the emerging markets. Moreover it is important 
that the ecosystem services markets do not pose a threat 
to poor people’s livelihood. The access to the forests 
and its goods and services must be ensured and food 
security cannot be endangered.
From the perspective of an international fair distri-
bution the results demonstrate that many tropical coun-
tries especially in Latin America and in Africa could 
benefit from ecosystem services markets by being sell-
ers of ecosystem services. The forests play a key role in 
providing these services. 
Despite these advantages suggested by this study, 
some studies illustrate that the gains from ecosystem 
services markets should benefit mainly the richer coun-
tries Cosello and Roson (1999, cited after Landell-Mills 
and Porras 2002).
Here it is suggested that in defining the rights to 
the ecosystem services and in establishing the markets, 
international fair distribution should be considered, as 
called by the Rio Declaration on Environment and De-
velopment.
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This study also shows that it should not be expect-
ed that pure markets for ecosystem services will lead 
to the sustainable scale of the economic system. The 
reality of the PES schemes is that, in fact, there is still 
no agreement regarding the levels of forest ecosystems 
services to be provided. There is still no created de-
mand for the forest ecosystem services and it is there-
fore not clear who should pay for their use. The drivers 
of these markets are still the buyers. Differently from 
the carbon markets, where property rights are some-
how more precisely defined through an overarching 
international agreement, the markets for the other for-
est ecosystem services are mainly determined by the 
willingness to pay of the interested buyers of ecosys-
tem services, such as governments, non-governmental 
organizations, or private companies (Landell-Mills 
and Porras 2002).
However, it is important to remember that the stud-
ies did not handle the question of the scale as such. 
Studies of PES focused mainly on the efficient alloca-
tion question, proving that the PES is an instrument to 
protect ecosystem services at lower costs, than whether 
PES can contribute to the sustainable scale of the eco-
nomic system guaranteeing a level of supply of ecosys-
tem services.
These results suggest that the scale cannot be set by 
the markets and thus it is necessary to define the sus-
tainable scale from the international perspective. It is 
necessary to know how much of which ecosystem serv-
ices from the forests men need. 
Once the scale and the commodities are defined, PES 
can be a good tool for sustainable development. After 
a level of production of ecosystem services is established, 
one can define how much of the forests, and which forests 
should be preserved. This is an important direction for 
suppliers to know what to produce. On the demand side, 
the assignment of property rights to the consumption of 
ecosystem services would oblige consumers to pay for 
it. After the scale (and a limit of consumption by coun-
try or by person for example) is set, the countries who 
want to consume extra amounts of ecosystem services 
should buy it from countries (persons) which have extra 
ecosystem services to provide. In the aggregate, the level 
of ecosystem services provided will be the one set by the 
international community, corresponding to the sustain-
able scale. This would be similar to the Pollution Trade 
markets set by the Kyoto Protocol.
These results suggest that the markets for ecosystem 
services can support sustainable development, acting 
similarly to the markets for pollution trading schemes 
which lead to the reduction of pollution levels in the 
USA. However, these markets need to be constrained 
by the scale question first, by the distribution question 
second, and only then can they be freely and efficiently 
allocated.
conclusIon
The payment for ecosystem services is being imple-
mented in several tropical forests in the globe with the 
objective to provide economic benefits for the people 
who ensure the maintenance, protection or the estab-
lishment or reestablishment of tropical forests. It aims 
to provide an incentive for people to conduct sustain-
able activities instead of degrading or converting these 
forests at the same time that it aims to provide some 
economic benefit to the mostly poor people living in 
these forest areas. 
Through the PES instrument, markets with buyers 
and sellers of ecosystem services are evolving in the 
actuality. The idea is that in an ideal stage, consumers 
of ecosystem services will pay for the ecosystem serv-
ices they consume from forests, and sellers will have 
a financial benefit to invest in protection, establishment 
of forests or other sustainable land use patterns such 
as agroforestry systems. At the end, all actors would 
consider the environmental impacts of their activities 
in their decisions, thus internalizing the externalities of 
their actions (being these either positive or negative).
The markets for ecosystem services are however 
very incipient in the world and the impacts of the PES 
towards sustainable development are still unclear. There 
are several concerns related to the distributional and 
ecological effects of this instrument.
This article analyzed the potentials of PES to con-
tribute to sustainable development in the Brazilian Am-
azon from ecological economics perspective. It shows 
that defining property rights to the ecosystem services, 
creating markets for them and allowing them to be trad-
ed is the most efficient alternative to solve the market 
failure related to the ecosystem services, being able to 
provide the greatest level of ecosystem services at the 
lowest costs. 
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However, this approach is not likely to address dis-
tributional issues properly (neither in the national nor 
in the international or intergenerational levels) and in 
addition, the markets will most probably not solve the 
scale problem. This problem is almost not handled in 
the economic mainstream literature.
The results suggest that the actual model of pay-
ments for forest ecosystem services are still driven by 
the willingness to pay of governments, NGOs, and some 
private actors. These markets are created by the defini-
tion of a price by the buyers. Although the markets may 
lead to the correct direction of sustainable development 
by stimulating the production of ecosystem services in 
some forest areas, it is still an incipient initiative to cre-
ate complete markets for ecosystem services. The prices 
still do not reflect marginal costs of producers and mar-
ginal benefits of consumers.
As there is still no obligatory demand for the eco-
system services determined by the scale limit and by 
the distribution of the rights for the ecosystem services, 
there is still no solution to the free riders problem and 
the ecosystem services are still not considered in the 
economic decisions of the majority of economic agents 
in the world. Thus, it is unlikely that these markets will 
lead to an efficient allocation, although they are already 
more efficient than in the complete absence of PES. 
These markets will not lead however to a sustainable 
scale, since the scarcity is not reflected in the prices of 
ecosystem services and the majority of the consumers 
can still consume them for free – leading to an over con-
sumption of these. Producers also do not benefit from 
ensuring ecosystem services supply and there is a ten-
dency for the undersupply of the services. Policy and 
governance instances, especially the international poli-
cy processes related to forests should raise these points 
for the ecosystem services from forests issues to come 
to the agenda. It is necessary to set international and 
national regulations to achieve the sustainable scale.
Economic theory already showed that a market 
approach will not be capable to solve the distribution 
problems. Therefore, it is necessary that complemen-
tary instruments are created to promote fairness from 
a local as well as from the international point of view. 
In dealing with forest and poor rural people, it is neces-
sary to know their limitations regarding their capacities 
to implement the land use systems demanded for eco-
system services supply, their lack of secure land ten-
ure, difficult access to markets, among other. Moreover, 
their livelihood should not be endangered by the instru-
ment, which could happen in case it poses high restric-
tions to the use of the forests, forest resources or forest 
land. The distribution of the rights is decisive for the 
distribution issue. Therefore, in distributing the rights, 
governments, governance instances should take the is-
sue into consideration and promote regulations and 
rules to stimulate a decrease in the levels of inequality 
in the society.
The fair distribution needs also to be thought in an 
international level. The international community must 
evaluate who are the consumers and the providers of eco-
system services and the property rights to the positive 
and negative externalities need to be assigned to the ac-
tors and nations. In this sense, it is necessary the interna-
tional negotiations develop and enhance the knowledge 
about what role forests play for human well being. It is 
necessary to work further towards a forest convention.
Science should work towards answering questions 
such as how much it would costs if technologies avail-
able would need to substitute the ecosystem functions 
from forests? Are they really capable to substitute forest 
functions? What are the limits? Which is the carrying 
capacity, how much are we using from it? What can be 
the consequences of the overuse of the forests carrying 
capacity? Here there is much need for further research. 
However, even with advancements in science, it 
cannot answer everything. And whether there is risk 
of irreversible harm, it is important to remember and 
reinforce the precautionary principle. Since several 
politicians, scientists and people insist in not to accept 
the limits of the earth, it will be difficult to come to an 
agreement regarding the sustainable scale, but it is ex-
tremely necessary.
Considering these limitations of a market approach, 
PES would however have high potentials to contribute 
to sustainable development in case the markets are con-
strained by the scale and distributional questions. As 
tested with the trading pollution permits, to determine 
a maximum scale for the pollution, distribute the rights 
to pollute, and let them to be traded showed to be an ef-
ficient way to combat air pollution in the United States. 
Once a level of pollution is determined, the rights to 
pollute can be distributed considering fairness issues. 
After that, market allocate efficiently. For instance in-
dustries that can reduce its levels of pollution can sell 
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pollution rights to other companies which would have 
higher costs to change their technologies. In the aggre-
gate, the pollution levels do not exceed the environmen-
tal goal and the environmental goal is achieved at lower 
costs. This is similar to the implementation scheme of 
the Kyoto Protocol. The problem there is that, although 
science demonstrates that the levels of green house gas-
es emissions should diminish, politicians insist not to 
accept more restrictions because of the consequences it 
would cause to the economy.
The Brazilian Amazon, having the biggest tropi-
cal forests in the world which provide many ecosystem 
services for the whole global community. Brazil has 
exceeding biocapacity and could therefore consolidate 
itself as a supplier of ecosystem services worldwide and 
benefit from selling ecosystem services. This would po-
tentially provide an important revenue source for this 
economically poor area. However, for the Amazon to 
beneficiate from the markets it is necessary to further 
negotiate in international arenas so that the scale is set 
and consequently the demand for ecosystems from for-
ests is created.
Brazil could however be a pioneer and create such 
markets internally so as it happens in Costa Rica pro-
moting a fair distribution of the benefits and costs with-
in the nation, the richer and high consuming areas pay-
ing for the Amazon to be protected. By having a good 
and working instrument it is likely that international 
communities will be more interested in participating of 
these markets.
But most importantly, Brazil needs to further ne-
gotiate in the international arena. The international 
discrepancies regarding the consumption of ecosystem 
services needs to be reduced as a manner to ensure 
a fairer world.
PES can be a good tool to promote sustainable devel-
opment for the Brazilian Amazon; however it depends 
on the implementation of such instrument. This article 
suggest that for PES or ecosystem services markets to 
contribute to sustainable development it is necessary 
to consider the three goals of efficient allocation, fair 
distribution, and sustainable scale – and complementary 
policies and regulations are necessary for it. PES can be 
a good tool if the markets for ecosystem services are 
constrained by the scale question first, by the distribu-
tion question second, and only then let the markets to 
allocate efficiently. 
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